



UNIVERSITY OF
GEORGIA

Evolution, epidemiology, and ~~RNA virus~~ disease Highly Pathogen Avian Influenza

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A brief history

- Prior to 2007 unified nomenclature and sub-clade classification was rare
- Most studies used descriptive names
 - Gs-GD-lineage
 - Qing Hai-lineage
 - Classic Swine-lineage
 - Etc etc
- Often used geographic location/host as a descriptor
 - Potential stigmatization

What changed?

RESEARCH ARTICLE | BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES | 



Emergence and predominance of an H5N1 influenza variant in China

G. J. D. Smith, X. H. Fan, J. Wang, , and Y. Guan  [Authors Info & Affiliations](#)

November 7, 2006 | 103 (45) 16936-16941 | <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0608157103>



Margaret Chan elected to lead the WHO on November 9, 2006

News | Published: 15 November 2006

WHO boss faces test of independence

[Declan Butler](#)

[Nature](#) 444, 250 (2006) | [Cite this article](#)



Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
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EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES®

Volume 14, Number 7—July 2008

Peer Reviewed Report Available Online Only

Toward a Unified Nomenclature System for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus (H5N1)

World Health Organization/World Organisation for Animal Health/Food and Agriculture Organization H5N1 Evolution Working Group.

Ruben O. Donis, **Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)**, (co-chair); Gavin J.D. Smith, **University of Hong Kong**; WHO, GIP, EPR; Veterinary Laboratories Agency, Addlestone, UK; Chinese Academy of Agriculture Sciences CAAS, Harbin, People's Republic of China; Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands; University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, USA; China Centers for Disease Control, Beijing, People's Republic of China; Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie, Padova, Italy; University of Hong Kong; WHO, GIP, EPR; University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.

Criteria used for clade designation

No.	Criteria
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1	Maintain previously designated clade numbers where possible (i.e., clade 2.2 remains 2.2 and clade 1 remains 1)
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2	New clade designations based on phylogenetic tree topology derived from all available sequences (the large tree)
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H5N1 progenitors (closest to Gs/Guangdong/1/96) re-designated as clade 0

Subsequent clades numbered starting from clade 3 (i.e., clades 3–9)

Clades designated by presence of a distinct common node shared by at least 4 isolates (in a monophyletic group)

Additional branches designated as a single clade evolves into more than one distinct lineage (i.e., clade 2.2 or clade 2.3.1; based on sharing of a common node and monophyletic grouping)



3	Average percentage pairwise distances between and within clades (using Kimura 2-parameter)
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Distinct clades should have >1.5% average distances between other clades

Distinct clades should have <1.5% average distances within the clade (may be slightly higher in clades with highly evolved outliers; i.e., Ck/Shanxi/2/2006 in clade 7)

4	Bootstrap (based on 1,000 neighbor-joining bootstrap replicates) $\geq 60\%$ bootstrap value at clade-defining node
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Phylogenetic relationships of the HA (A) and NA (B) genes of representative influenza A viruses.



J. Wang et al. J. Virol. 2008; doi:10.1128/JVI.02468-07

Real-time tracking of influenza A/H5N1 virus evolution



Built with [nextstrain/avian-flu](#). Maintained by [Louise Moncla](#). Data updated 2024-04-02. Enabled by data from

Showing 3095 of 3095 genomes sampled between Dec 1996 and Mar 2024.

Phylogeny


Provisional LABEL clade ^


- 0
- 1
- 1-8-9-like
- 1.1
- 1.1.1
- 1.1.2
- 2-like
- 2.1.1
- 2.1.2
- 2.1.3
- 2.1.3.1
- 2.1.3.2
- 2.1.3.2a
- 2.1.3.2b
- 2.1.3.3
- 2.2
- 2.2.1
- 2.2.1.1
- 2.2.1.1a
- 2.2.1.2
- 2.2.2
- 2.2.2.1
- 2.3.1
- 2.3.2
- 2.3.2.1
- 2.3.2.1a
- 2.3.2.1b
- 2.3.2.1c
- 2.3.2.1c-like
- 2.3.2.1d
- 2.3.2.1e
- 2.3.2.1f
- 2.3.2.1g
- 2.3.3
- 2.3.4
- 2.3.4.1
- 2.3.4.2
- 2.3.4.3
- 2.3.4.4-like
- 2.3.4.4b
- 2.3.4.4c
- 2.3.4.4g
- 2.4
- 2.5
- 3
- 3-like
- 4
- 5
- 5-6-like
- 6
- 7
- 7.1
- 7.2
- 8
- 9
- EA-nonGsGD
- Am-nonGsGD



ZOOM TO SELECTED

RESET LAYOUT













2.3.4 Global - Wild Birds, poultry, mammals, humans


2.3.1.e Southeast Asia - Poultry

2.3.1.g Indonesia - Poultry

2.3.1.a Bangladesh, Nepal, India - Poultry

2.2 Eurasia and Middle East - Wild Bird, poultry











Ecosystem interaction model

© Discrete Model:






	A_D	B_D	A_W	B_W
A_D	.	π_{Bi}	π_{Cj}	π_{Dk}
B_D	π_{Ai}	.	π_{Cl}	π_{Dm}
A_W	π_{Aj}	π_{Bl}	.	π_{Dn}
B_W	π_{Ak}	π_{Bm}	π_{Cn}	.



Supported migration rates between ecosystems


- Bahl J et al. *PLoS Pathogens*
doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1005620




2014–2015 HPAI H5Nx Outbreak


- December 2014: H5N2 detection in British Columbian commercial poultry
- December 2014: H5N8 and H5N2 detection in Pacific northwest wild birds and backyard poultry
- January 2015: First US commercial poultry detection (California)

Figure 5. Total Incidence of HPAI in the United States by Week



Note: Date pictured is earliest available date indicating clinical signs. This is a clinical sign date if known, a suspect status, or a presumptive positive status. Some premises may only have a confirmed positive status date.


ALee et al *EID* (2018) doi: 10.3201/eid2410.171891

A

Transmission among poultry farms

Epidemic region and host



- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------|
| Midwest chicken | Pacific turkey |
| Midwest turkey | Pacific wild bird |
| Midwest wild bird | Backyard game bird |
| Pacific chicken | |



Transmission among wild bird with
period spillover to domestic birds




Dr. Joe Hicks
Imperial College



Hicks JT et al. *PLoS Pathogens* (2020) doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1007857

Hypothesized Models



S = Susceptible Farm

I = Infected Farm



R = Culled Farm

U = Unknown external viral source


T = Turkey production system

C = Layer chicken production system

Model Fit Comparison



Highly pathogenic avian influenza is a disease threat that crosses ecological systems and scales



Ramey et al J Wildl Manag, 2022, DOI: (10.1002/jwmg.22171)

H5N1 emergence

- Resulted from complex ecology of farms & live-poultry markets in southern China
- Different bird species harbor different influenza A subtypes
- Markets allow interaction between different bird species
 - Aquatic poultry (goose, duck)
 - Terrestrial poultry (chicken)
 - Minor poultry (especially quail)
- Regional lineages – likely determined by trade
- Spillover to wild avian populations have resulted in widescale spread

A sub-clade classification system should be useful

- For HPAI – viral ecology, epidemiology determine how evolutionary mechanisms
- **Pathogen Diversity:** is driven by natural selection, mutation, drift, migration
- **Ecology:** HPAI has a massive host range. Behavior, contact rates, transmission mechanism, and population size differs and can impact phylogenetic patterns
- **Epidemiology:** timing of transmission and risk associated with climate in wild birds, distribution and epizootic size associated with established trade routes for domestic animals

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Dong-Hun Lee, Gavin Smith, Andy Ramey, Nichola Hill, Yi Guan, Malik Pieris, Vijay Dhanasekaren



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UGA CIDER (75N93021C00018)

UGA CIVIC (75N93019C00052)

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Georgia Pathogen Genomics Center of Excellence

Influenza (75D30119C06826, 75D30121C11990)

SARS-CoV-2 (75D30121C11159, 75D30121C10133)

NSF RAPID: 2029595



Terrible Assumptions!

- Virus behaves the same in all wild and domestic populations
- Assume all anseriformes migrate in the same patterns
 - Host specific migration behaviors are irrelevant
- Our sampling is representative
 - A few thousand birds are sampled out of millions of breeding pairs